Authors: Ms. Shambhavy Singh (Senior Associate) and Mr. Sayan Kumar Panda (Associate)
The legal landscape governing economic regulation in India has reached a critical juncture, defined by a persistent and increasingly sophisticated tension between the cross-sectoral mandate of the Competition Commission of India (CCI/ Commission) and the domain-specific authority of various sectoral regulators. For nearly two decades, the CCI has time and again found itself at an impasse, where its jurisdiction has been challenged and purportedly questioned even though it has been specifically bestowed with the responsibility of regulating competition in India.
The position of CCI as a quasi-judicial body established to ensure fair competition in India was solidified by the Supreme Court of India in CCI v. SAIL[1]. However, since then, the CCI has been put head-to-head with several sectoral regulators challenging or attempting to oust its jurisdiction when trying to regulate the anti-competitive conduct that emanates from within the umbrella of a different special law, and the courts had to step in to safeguard the powers bestowed upon the CCI.
At present, there are two divergent judicial approaches. The first, as exemplified by the Supreme Court in CCI v. Bharti Airtel[2], favours a ‘sectoral regulator first’ approach, such that, sequentially, issues concerning technical and regulatory competence should be adjudicated by such regulators, without depriving the CCI of its substantive jurisdiction under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) to investigate allegations of anti-competitive actions.
However, recently the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. CCI[3] (Division Bench Judgement) held that the market regulator lacked the jurisdiction to commence any proceeding in relation to the exercise of the proprietary rights by a patentee under the Patents Act, 1970 (Patents Act). Since a settlement was reached between the parties, the Supreme Court decided not to interfere with the Division Bench Judgment, keeping the questions of law open, to be agitated in future cases.[4]
The Division Bench Judgement interpreted the conflict between the applicability of one law over the other as one being general and the other being special viz. if the CCI has the power to investigate into issues arising out of the rights of a patentee bestowed upon it under the Patents Act, versus anti-competitive concerns arising out of the actions of the patentee. In the latter case, the CCI does have the right and jurisdiction to investigate and proceed against the patentee, as proceedings by the CCI are in rem (unlike the ones entrusted upon the Patent Controller – which are in personam).
Jurisdiction at the crossroads again
Amidst the ongoing tussle between the CCI and the Patent Controller, parallelly another case was being looked into by the CCI[5]. The allegation pertained to commercial exploitation of a patented drug by Vifor International AG resulting in foreclosure of competing manufacturers through selective and restrictive licensing. Since the contention of the CCI’s jurisdiction was still sub-judice before the Delhi High Court, the CCI in a move to reinstate its position observed that “the wordings of Section 3(5) make it amply clear that jurisdiction of the Commission is not ousted in any manner, merely because the matter is also a subject matter of Patent Act or any other intellectually property law statute, as has been claimed by Vifor”.[6]
The Commission, while analysing the quandary in the Vifor Case, noted that “no embargos have been noticed qua the powers of the Commission, in relation to IP protected rights, as is evident from the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Act, subject to the limitation that Commission has to, in appropriate cases, determine either the existence or non-existence of a right, flowing through an intellectual property held by the party or derived by it and the reasonability of the exercise of such right, when posed as a defense before it, in an allegation of violation of Section 3 of the Act. There is nothing that ex facie warrants the Commission to circumscribe its powers, in aid of exercise towards sustaining free and fairer market, when distortions can be induced through an anti-competitive conduct arising out of an intellectual property right, the use or non-use of which borders on unreasonableness.”[7]
The Commission correctly closed the matter, observing prima facie that the clauses of the licence agreement were neither one-sided nor unreasonable and that there was nothing on record to indicate that the licensees possessed such pervasive market presence or that the market structure impeded the entry of other manufacturers of soluble iron injectables, apart from the inter se restrictions under the agreement.[8] However, the informant appealed this order before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The NCLAT passed its final order in October 2025[9] stating that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon allegations emanating from the Patents Act. It relied upon the Division Bench Judgement and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court; and observed that “it is apparent that the CCI lacks the power to examine the allegations made against Vifor International (AG)”, and held that “the Patent Act will prevail over the Competition Act in the facts of this case”.
The CCI appealed, and the matter is now before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to decide whether the CCI would prevail in adjudicating anti-competitive issues, even if emanating from the rights issued to a patentee under the Patents Act.
Basis of the Divisional Bench Judgement
The Division Bench’s reasoning in Ericsson is based on the fact that Chapter XVI of the Patents Act is a later and special enactment which must prevail over the Competition Act. This premise, however, becomes problematic upon a closer examination of the legislative chronology.
The Division Bench referred to the Patents Act as having been amended in 2003 to include Chapter XVI. This, it is said revealed the ‘legislative intent’ as Parliament was fully aware of the Competition Act of 2002. However, Chapter XVI of the Patents Act received Presidential assent on 25 June 2002[10] and was published in the Official Gazette on the same date, while the Competition Act received presidential assent on 13 January 2003[11] and was published in the Gazette the following day i.e., 14 January 2003.
The provisions of Chapter XVI of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2003 were brought into force on 20 May 2003[12], while several key provisions notably Sections 60 and 62 of the Competition Act, were brought into force only subsequently on 19 June 2003[13]. While Section 60 provides overriding powers under the Competition Act in case of any inconsistency with other laws, Section 62 clarifies that the provisions of the Competition Act are ‘in addition to, and not in derogation of” any other law for the time being in force.
In several cases, where the CCI was put at crossroads with different sectoral regulators, it has thoroughly examined the position that when there are two special laws at an impasse, covering similar subject areas, then the later one must prevail.[14]
Section 3(5) of the Competition Act is not a jurisdiction ouster
The Division Bench proceeded on the premise that the assessment of the “reasonableness” of conditions imposed in agreements concerning the exercise of patent rights falls exclusively within the domain of the Patents Act. This approach appears contrary to the plain language of Section 3(5) of the Competition Act, which makes it clear that the CCI retains jurisdiction to examine whether the conditions imposed by a patent holder, in the course of exercising its statutory rights, are in fact reasonable. The determination of whether an agreement, or a contractual restraint, satisfies the standard of reasonableness for the purposes of competition law lies within the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of the CCI.
Further, by virtue of Section 61 of the Competition Act, the jurisdiction of civil courts and, in matters relating to anti-competitive conduct, that of the Controller under the Patents Act, stands expressly excluded. It is equally significant that, had the legislature intended to place patent-related conduct altogether beyond the scrutiny of competition law, it could have done so in clear and express terms. For example, several key areas like defence, currency, and atomic energy have been kept outside its ambit.[15]
Appreciation for the overarching power of the CCI
A comparative reading of the statutory schemes of the Patents Act and the Competition Act makes it evident that the two enactments operate in distinct, though complementary fields. Under the Patents Act, the Controller is concerned with matters intrinsic to a particular patent such as grant, validity, infringement, revocation and compulsory licensing, whereas the Competition Act confers an economy-wide mandate upon the CCI to examine agreements and market conduct that may cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition or amount to abuse of dominant position, irrespective of the sector in which such conduct arises.
Moreover, Section 18 of the Competition Act casts a positive and economy-wide obligation upon the CCI to eliminate practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition, a mandate which the Supreme Court has recognised as forming the very core of the Act and as guiding the exercise of all powers under it[16].
The breadth of this obligation is articulated in Sections 60 and 62 of the Competition Act, which provide for the overriding effect in case of inconsistency and clarify that the provisions operate “in addition to, and not in derogation of” any other law for the time being in force.
Conclusion
The jurisprudential conflict traced from Ericsson to Vifor case, reveals that the fault line is not between patent protection and competition enforcement, but between institutional coordination and jurisdictional exclusion. As held by the Single Judge Bench in the Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. CCI[17], the CCI must have the final adjudicatory power in matters concerning anti-competitive practices, even if arising out of the actions of a patentee in furtherance of the rights bestowed upon it under the Patents Act, because it is only the CCI which would be fully versed with the relevant aspects of competition in the market.
[1] Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India & Anr., (2010) 10 SCC 744.
[2] Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 521, para 122.
[3] Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. CCI & Anr., (2023) SCC OnLine Del 4078.
[4] Special Leave Petition (C) No. 25026 of 2023in Competition Commission of India v. Monsanto Holdings Private Limited and Ors., order dated 02 September 2025.
[5] Swapan Dey v. Vifor International AG., Case No. 05 of 2022, order dated 25 October 2022 (Vifor Case).
[6] Swapan Dey v. Vifor International AG., Case No. 05 of 2022, order dated 25 October 2022, para 65.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Swapan Dey v. Vifor International AG., Case No. 05 of 2022, order dated 25 October 2022, para 74.
[9] Swapan Dey v. Competition Commission of India and Anr.,Competition Appeal (AT) No. 05 of 2023, Order dated 30 October 2025
[10] Ministry of Law and Justice, Gazette of India, No. 38 of 2002, Extraordinary, Part II- Section 1, dated 25 June 2002
[11] Ministry of Law and Justice, Gazette of India, No. 12 of 2003, Extraordinary, Part II- Section 1, dated 14 January 2003
[12] Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion), S.O. 561 (E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II-Section III, dated 20 May 2003
[13] Ministry of Finance (Department of Corporate Affairs), S.O. 715(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II-Section I, dated 19 June 2003.
[14] Combination Registration No. C-2021/03/824, Proceedings against Tata Power Company Limited under Section 43A of the Competition Act, 2002, Order dated 17 March 2022, paras 16, 21; Case No. 68 of 2016, Biocon Ltd. v. Roche Products, paras 40,41, Order dated 21 April 2017; Proceedings against Torrent Power Limited under Section 43A of the Competition Act, 2002, paras 19, 21, 23, 30, 32, 36, Order dated 14 January 2025,; Case No. 01 of 202, In Re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp users, paras 28, 29, Order dated 18 November 2024.
[15] Section 2(h) of the Competition Act. See, Metallurgical Products India Private Limited v. Government of India and IREL (India) Limited, Case No. 33 of 2023 and Beach Mineral Producers Association and Anr. v. Directorate General of Foreign Trade and Ors., Case No. 19 of 2019.
[16] Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India & Anr., (2010) 10 SCC 744.
[17] W.P.(C) 464 of 2014 in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. CCI, Order dated 30 March 2016.
Disclaimer: This article represents our understanding and interpretation of the relevant laws as on the date hereof and is provided without expressing any opinion, advice, or recommendation. The interpretations set out herein are subject to change, and there can be no assurance that any regulator, authority, or judicial body will concur with or adopt a position consistent with our views expressed in this article. This article is furnished solely for academic and informational purposes and should not be construed as legal advice or relied upon for any purpose whatsoever.